Only on chapter 2 but enjoying the book so far. Introduced me to the philosopher Roman Ingarden, who it looks like, I’ll have to read more. Mitscherling’s book dovetails nicely with some of my current concerns. His eight “…statements of the central Concept-Terms” followed by an interesting discussion of each item separately has been really good so far. The eight theses are: [quoted from Kindle ]:
(1) Intentionality is not “of consciousness”. (2) Being is not merely some abstract concept. (3) Substance is not “stuff”. (4) Essence is not some “thing” that an entity “possesses”. (5) Form is not “shape”. (6) The soul is not some supernatural “thing” that an animal “possesses”. (7) The mind is not reducible either to material being or to ideal being. (8) A concept is not a “mental thing” that we “possess”. (9) A habit is not some “thing” that an organism “possesses”.
(1) is pretty radical, I think. As the blurb says, “This book describes not only the origin, or ‘genesis,’ of human cognition in sensation, but also the genesis of sensation from intentional structures belonging to nature itself.” Mitscherling will be trying to demonstrate that there is such a ‘thing’ as “the Intentional Being of Nature” that is real yet not some thing we should just think of as ‘stuff.’ I find this intriguing, especially, because he proposes to show that the notion of intentional being overcomes the bifurcation between mind and nature. In effect, this study seems to be trying to do the exact opposite of what I critiqued in my last post. I will have more to say as make it through the book.